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The GICHD works towards reducing risks to communities stemming from 
explosive ordnance, with particular focus on mines, cluster munitions, other 
explosive remnants of war and ammunition storage. The Centre helps develop 
and professionalise the sector for the benefits of its partners: national and 
local authorities, donors, the United Nations, other international and regional 
organisations, non-governmental organisations, commercial companies and 
academia. It does so by combining three distinct lines of service: field support 
focused on capacity development and advice, multilateral work focused on norms 
and standards, and research and development focused on cutting-edge solutions. 
Based at the Maison de la paix in Geneva, the GICHD employs around 70 staff 
members from 23 different countries. This makes it a unique and international centre 
of expertise and knowledge. Our work is made possible by core contributions, 
project funding and in-kind support from more than 30 governments and 
organisations.
Acknowledgements
This guide was jointly prepared by GICHD Team – Marc Bonnet, Fatmire Uka, Stanislav Damjanovic, 
Armen Harutyunyan and Roly Evans, with the technical support of “Mine Action Consulting”.
This guide was supported by the project entitled ‘NTS Standardisation, Essentials and  
E-learning’, funded by the Swiss Government and the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade. The ideas, opinions, and comments therein are entirely the responsibility of its 
authors and do not necessarily represent or reflect the Swiss or Australian Aid policy.
A Guide to Non-Technical Survey – First edition © GICHD, Geneva, August 2019
ISBN: 978-2-940369-78-2
The designation employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression 
of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the GICHD concerning the legal status of any country, territory or armed 
groups, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. C
ov
er
: N
on
-T
ec
hn
ic
al
 S
ur
ve
y 
Fi
el
d 
A
cc
re
d
it
at
io
n,
 C
ol
om
b
ia
, 2
01
3
A GUIDE TO 
NON-TECHNICAL SURVEY
FIRST EDITION
4 | Contents
Abbreviations and acronyms 6
Executive Summary 7
INTRODUCTION 10
LAND RELEASE CONCEPT 13
NON-TECHNICAL SURVEY – GENERAL PRINCIPLES 17
NON-TECHNICAL SURVEY PROCESS 19
Desk assessment 20
Pre-deployment planning 21
Village/stakeholder meeting 21
Field visits 22
Assessment of findings 23
Reporting and debriefing 24
Internal QM of reporting 24
Compiling and submitting reports 24
SOURCES OF INFORMATION 24
Data collection and analysis 25
Data collection in urban areas 26
Classification of sources 27
Confidence in sources and evidence 28
LAND USE CATEGORIES/PRIORITISATION 29
EVIDENCE 31
Indirect evidence 32
Direct evidence 33
CRITERIA FOR THE DEFINITION OF AN SHA AND CHA 36
EVIDENCE-BASED, DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 39
CONTENTS
Contents | 5
BASIC IDENTIFICATION OF EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE 40
Photos of EO or suspicious objects 41
GPS coordinates of EO or suspicious objects 42
Marking of SHA/CHA/EO 43
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 44
NTS TEAM REQUIREMENTS 46
Team composition and training 47
Team equipment 48
TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR NTS TEAMS 50
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES FOR NTS 52
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NTS AND TS 53
COMMUNICATION IN NTS 54
Interview techniques 54
Cross-cultural communication 57
GENDER AND DIVERSITY 58
Equality and inclusion considerations for NTS 58
QUALITY MANAGEMENT 59
Internal process 59
External process 61
SAFETY AND SECURITY IN THE FIELD 62
RISK EDUCATION AFTER NTS 63
TECHNOLOGY IN NTS 65
Mobile applications 65
Unmanned aerial systems 66
VISITORS TO NTS OPERATIONS 67
RESPONSIBILITIES AND OBLIGATIONS 68
Annex A – NTS Process Map 69

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
CHA
Confirmed Hazardous 
Area
EO
Explosive Ordnance
EOD
Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal
EORE
Explosive Ordnance Risk 
Education
GICHD
Geneva International 
Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining
GPS
Global positioning 
system
IM
Information 
Management
IMAS
International Mine 
Action Standards
IMSMA
Information 
Management System 
for Mine Action
LR
Land Release
LSA
Land service 
ammunition
NMAA
National mine action 
authority
NMAS
National mine action 
standards
NTS
Non-Technical Survey
QA
Quality assurance
QC
Quality control
QM
Quality management
QMS
Quality management 
system
SHA
Suspected Hazardous 
Area
SOPs
Standard Operating 
Procedures
TS
Technical Survey
UAS
Unmanned aerial 
system
UAV
Unmanned aerial vehicle
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8 | Executive summary
The aim of this guide is to provide an introduction to Non-Technical Survey 
(NTS) for mine action personnel who wish to learn more about the subject, 
but who may lack practical experience. This guide collects the lessons 
learnt from the development and standardisation of the Geneva International 
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) Non-Technical Survey Training 
Course and will form part of the pre-course reading material. It aims to 
provide course participants with a better understanding of the theory 
and practice of NTS operations. The importance of the practical training 
cannot be overstated, and this guide is not meant to replace it, but rather 
to complement and support it. This guide is also intended to complement 
IMAS Chapter 07.11 Land Release and IMAS Chapter 08.10 Non-Technical 
Survey. This guide will be updated as needed in the future with a spirit of 
a continuous improvement process.
NTS is an important component of the Land Release (LR) process. Typically, 
NTS is the first operational step in implementing an LR process and, as such, 
it can be seen as the foundation upon which all subsequent LR activities are 
based. NTS consists of gathering information from desk assessments and 
field visits. This information forms the basis of a logical, evidence-based, 
decision-making process that allows surveyors to classify any area that is 
surveyed as either being free from any suspicion of Explosive Ordnance 
(EO) or being a Suspected or Confirmed Hazardous Area (SHA or CHA).
Where there is doubt about the reliability of previously identified hazardous 
areas based on outdated survey data, NTS is an important tool to test the 
evidence on which these previously identified hazardous areas may be 
cancelled in whole or in part.
In the context of LR, NTS is not a stand-alone process; it is closely connected 
to Technical Survey, clearance, post-Land Release assessment, operations 
quality management and Information Management. All of these activities 
and related processes typically follow on from NTS and can all be seen as 
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forms of comprehensive quality management for NTS, either confirming or 
not the NTS findings. The follow-on activities will either prove or disprove 
the reliability of the evidence collected during NTS and therefore enable 
the survey process to continually improve. All cancelled, reduced and 
cleared areas should be subject to follow-up assessment as part of the 
quality management system (facilitated by the Information Management 
[IM] system).
NTS does not involve any search or ground processing assets entering any 
area that is potentially hazardous, therefore it is significantly less expensive 
than Technical Survey (TS) and clearance operations. NTS is the most cost-
efficient component of the LR process and should be prioritised over TS 
and clearance whenever possible.
The type and quality of evidence found during NTS will determine 
the overall outcome of the survey. If NTS finds direct evidence of EO 
contamination, the result will be a CHA associated to a polygon, or a 
reported spot Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) task; whereas indirect 
evidence would produce a SHA. If no evidence is found in any part of a 
previously identified hazardous area based on outdated survey data, the 
recommendation would be made to cancel the relevant portion of the area. 
If no evidence is found in a newly surveyed area, that area will be recorded 
(geotagged) as having been surveyed but no additional LR process would 
be undertaken.
All information collected during the NTS process should be accurately 
recorded with sufficient details, and subject to internal quality controls 
before being entered into the IM system. The raw data itself should be 
retained by a competent authority, in case of any subsequent need for a 
review of the decision-making process. Information collected during NTS 
should be available in the format specified by the national mine action 
authority (NMAA).
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INTRODUCTION
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 07.11 defines Land Release as: 
“…the process of applying all reasonable effort to identify, define, and remove 
all presence and suspicion of Explosive Ordnance through non-technical survey, 
technical survey and/or clearance”.
Land Release (LR) in humanitarian mine action is an evidence-based, decision-
making process that is used to declare with confidence that land is free of 
Explosive Ordnance (EO) contamination according to nationally agreed norms. 
Once an LR policy has been approved by a state, national mine action standards 
(NMAS) are developed which provide specifications and guidelines regarding the 
implementation of the process. As mine action is a set of complex and variable 
activities that differ from country to country, there is no single template that can 
be applied to every situation.
In the majority of countries, Non-Technical Survey (NTS) is typically the first step 
in the LR process and as such, every mine action activity that follows is based 
on the accuracy of the evidence collected during NTS. NTS can be seen as the 
foundation upon which most subsequent mine action activities are built, and its 
importance cannot be overstated. Implementing NTS to the highest standards 
is of fundamental importance to the effectiveness and efficiency with which the 
remainder of the LR process is applied.
As the starting point for land assessment, NTS categorises areas based on whether 
or not there is any evidence that EO contamination exists within them. Areas are 
then recorded as either being free from any suspicion of EO contamination or as 
being Suspected or Confirmed Hazardous Areas (SHAs or CHAs). NTS may also 
identify individual items of EO and define these individual items as being spot 
tasks, not associated with polygons, requiring further Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
(EOD) action but not requiring Technical Survey (TS) or clearance.
NTS can be broken down into eight elements, as shown in the diagram at page 19. 
NTS begins with a desk assessment, where all requests from the community, 
area maps, accident reports, previous survey reports and any other information 
is collected and analysed to determine whether it is necessary to conduct a field 
visit. It is possible that the desk assessment may not result in a field visit, which 
may be the case if the desk assessment shows that the location in question cannot 
correspond to any conceivable contaminated area. An example of this might be a 
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site that is several kilometres off the coast of a country, indicating that erroneous 
coordinates have previously been entered into the Information Management (IM) 
system.
Pre-deployment planning would normally follow on from the desk assessment. 
Deployments generally begin with a meeting with the local community, from 
which decisions can be taken about where to conduct specific site visits, if there 
is general information to suggest that EO contamination is present. The site visit 
primarily consists of gathering evidence and information by questioning local 
communities, as well as through physical inspection from a safe area. Once 
information is gathered from community members or any other source, it is 
assessed for reliability and accuracy before being entered into a standard NTS 
report. The NTS report is checked for any errors and omissions before being 
entered into the IM system.
All elements of NTS revolve around identifying, accessing, collecting, classifying, 
reporting and using information to help define where EO is to be found, as well 
as where there is no evidence of contamination. The information collected during 
Non-Technical Survey Training, Thailand, 2016
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NTS supports the land cancellation, reduction and clearance decision-making 
processes. It is just as important for an NTS team to identify areas that are not 
showing evidence of EO contamination, as it is to identify areas that are suspected 
or confirmed as being contaminated.
NTS may produce enough evidence on its own to allow the determination to 
be made, with confidence, that the land does not contain an EO hazard. If the 
requirements to apply “all reasonable effort” have been met, the land can be 
cancelled. IMAS provides guidance on what can be considered as “all reasonable 
effort” for NTS but it is ultimately the responsibility of the national mine action 
authority to clarify and determine what that means in individual countries.
As NTS does not involve the use of any search or ground processing assets 
entering an area, it is significantly less expensive than TS and clearance. When 
compared to TS and clearance, NTS can also have the greatest impact, measured 
in terms of square metres of land released (cancelled). The use of NTS should, 
wherever possible, be the first step in the LR process.
NTS should be closely connected to any subsequent activities within the LR 
process. The continual improvement of NTS processes and procedures is reliant 
upon an analysis of the accuracy of the information collected during survey against 
what is actually found (or not found) during the technical processes. The longer-
term monitoring of areas following handover also helps the continual improvement 
of the entire LR process.
It is important to understand the importance of developing NMAS that are both 
IMAS compliant and context specific.
This guide aims to achieve the following goals:
a. Ensure a comprehensive understanding of NTS (terminology, processes, 
and reporting).
b. Form the basis for continual improvement of NTS operations and NTS 
Standard Operating Procedures.
c. Form the basis for development of the NTS training curriculum/packages.
d. Promote the efficient implementation of NTS, which is fully NMAS 
compliant.
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LAND RELEASE CONCEPT
All authorities, agencies and operators involved in Explosive Ordnance (EO) reme-
diation should do their utmost to ensure that resources are deployed in the most 
operationally efficient manner possible. Operational resources are expensive and 
limited and their efficient deployment ensures that they offer the best return on 
investment for all parties, including donors and beneficiaries.
The world of EO contamination is complex, so achieving better operational effi-
ciency can also be complex, and is highly dependent upon local circumstances. 
Nonetheless, one of the primary ways of achieving better operational efficiency 
is to implement the concepts and practices of Land Release (LR).
LR essentially involves implementing intrusive methods of inspection only when 
there is sufficient evidence to suggest that an EO hazard may exist. The LR process 
is a logical process that begins with the initial identification of an EO threat (or of 
the lack of an EO threat). It then seeks to define the nature and extent of any EO 
threat before applying all reasonable effort to show with confidence that any 
EO threat that did exist, has been removed.
Survey team interviewing a farmer, Colombia, 2012
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The nature and level of the reasonable effort required in the framework of national 
mine action standards to implement the LR process is dependent upon:
• the specific local circumstances and conditions;
• what part of the LR process was last carried out and;
• the implications of any new information discovered as the process 
progresses.
As previously discussed, it is possible that the desk assessment alone may indicate 
that a previously identified hazardous areas based on outdated survey data cannot 
exist in a given location. In this instance, the desk assessment could be defined as 
constituting all reasonable effort, once it has been subject to the relevant quality 
management (QM) processes.
Practical effort is applied through Non-Technical Survey (NTS), Technical Survey 
(TS) and clearance. The process typically begins with NTS and then progresses on 
to TS and then on to clearance, but there is no requirement for it to follow any set 
sequence, as each set of circumstances is different. Operational decision makers 
should keep the idea of operational efficiency at the forefront of all planning and 
ensure that they retain the flexibility to react to new information as it becomes 
available. It is not uncommon for a single task to go through multiple stages of 
NTS, TS and clearance before it is concluded that all reasonable effort has been 
made and the land can be released.
NTS typically establishes whether or not there is evidence of an EO hazard, its 
general nature and approximate location, through the creation of a Suspected 
Hazardous Area (SHA), or Confirmed Hazardous Area (CHA) if there is direct 
evidence of the existence of EO contamination. TS typically follows NTS and tries 
to gather more evidence, with the goal of establishing the precise nature of the 
hazard, the precise area the hazard is contained in and any factors that may affect 
the operational decisions relating to the clearance process. If TS confirms the 
presence of an EO hazard, or other kinds of direct evidence within an SHA, a CHA 
report would be produced. The CHA would normally be expected to be smaller 
and better defined than the preceding SHA. Clearance builds on the information 
from NTS and TS and ensures that the EO hazard has been removed from a 
specified area to a specified depth or other agreed parameters, as stipulated by 
the national mine action authority (NMAA)/Tasking Authority. However, in some 
cases, the CHA may be larger than the initial SHA, as the result of new evidence 
discovered through TS. This is important to note, as it is a common operational 
mistake to assume that new evidence would always reduce the size of the area 
that needs to be processed.
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The LR process should be supported by an effective Information Management 
(IM) system that:
• ensures that data are collected accurately and consistently;
• facilitates reporting in compliance with all required formats and schedules;
• ensures that information is entered correctly into databases, after having 
been subjected to quality checks;
• analyses the data to provide reliable IM services to an organisation’s 
programme and operation management units and any other stakeholders 
requiring the information and;
• disseminates the information in a timely manner to those that require it.
Authorities and operators should actively identify, access and use all relevant sources 
of data, information and analysis in support of the LR process.
Non-technical
survey
Technical
survey
FIGURE 1 ELEMENTS OF THE LAND RELEASE PROCESS
© GICHD 2019
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In addition to the details of “what was found where” that are collected, recorded 
and reported, authorities and agencies should ensure that the information is 
analysed to help identify trends, patterns or other characteristics that can help 
decision makers make valid, efficient decisions based on actual evidence, thereby 
increasing confidence in the LR process.
Where data indicate shortcomings in the LR process, those data should be used 
to support continual improvement of procedures, practice and policies.
The LR process requires decisions to be made in real world situations, which 
frequently do not offer simple, clearly defined circumstances. The nature of an EO 
hazard and the way in which it is distributed is key to determining how to maximise 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the LR process.
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) contain guidance on all aspects of 
the LR process:
• IMAS 07.10 (Guide for the management of Land Release and Residual 
Contamination Operations) provides a broad overview of the stages of an 
LR operation
• IMAS 07.11 (Land Release) outlines the entire process of LR
• IMAS 08.10 (Non-Technical Survey) provides specific guidance on the 
principles of NTS
• IMAS 08.20 (Technical Survey) provides specific guidance on the principles 
of TS, the conduct of TS, and outlines how land can be reduced through TS
• IMAS 09.10 (Clearance requirements) provides the requirements for the 
conduct of clearance and the release of land through clearance
• IMAS 09.11 (Battle Area Clearance) provides the requirements for the 
conduct of Battle Area Clearance and the release of land through Battle 
Area Clearance
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NON-TECHNICAL SURVEY – GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES
Non-Technical Survey (NTS) aims to provide accurate, evidence-based information 
regarding the presence or absence of Explosive Ordnance (EO) contamination. 
NTS further aims to provide detailed information on context-adapted reporting 
forms about the nature of a Suspected Hazardous Area (SHA) or Confirmed 
Hazardous Area (CHA), including its exact location, its size, the nature of expected 
EO hazards, patterns of EO, special features (trenches, river banks, fox holes, 
etc.), security, medical support, local environment and infrastructure. NTS is often 
carried out jointly with Community Liaison teams, in which case the NTS teams 
are also responsible for collecting impact-related data, which can be used in task 
prioritisation.
The Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for each operator should be in 
compliance with national mine action standards (NMAS) and contain as much 
clarity as possible on what constitutes direct and indirect evidence in the specific 
country context, as this can vary considerably between countries. It is strongly 
suggested that national mine action authorities (NMAAs) and operators develop 
country-specific evidence guides consistent with the national reporting forms. 
The operator’s SOPs should also emphasise the training, qualifications and 
competencies that NTS staff are required to have. In addition, the SOPs should 
specify how these requirements will be quality assured and recorded. NTS is a 
specific discipline within LR, which requires specific training in both hard and soft 
skills; it should only be undertaken by suitably qualified, trained and equipped 
teams.
SOPs and NMAS should specify how NTS is incorporated into the overall Land 
Release (LR) concept and processes. They should also ensure that NTS is incorpo-
rated into both internal and external quality management systems and Information 
Management.
If dealing with previously identified hazardous areas based on outdated survey 
data, NTS has the potential to cancel those areas, or parts thereof, if the evidence 
justifies doing so.
There should never be a requirement for NTS teams to enter a potentially 
hazardous area. The entire NTS process should be carried out from safe ground, 
including site visits and interaction with informants. Likewise, informants should 
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always be asked to indicate the area from safe ground, rather than taking the NTS 
team into any potentially hazardous area. Informants may include local authorities, 
local community members, ex-combatants and local security forces.
In circumstances where the primary evidence source is the local population, but 
that local population is no longer present, there is little to be gained from carrying 
out a field visit. If a field visit were to be implemented, it would almost invariably 
result in the need to return at a later date. There may, however, be circumstances 
where the desk study alone, in the absence of any local population, has produced 
sufficient evidence, such as aerial photography or minefield records, to justify the 
decision to implement Technical Survey (TS) operations.
Some operators have embedded a small TS or Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) 
component within NTS teams, as determined by local circumstances. This is 
especially relevant in areas where single items of EO have been moved by local 
people and placed out of context. The TS or EOD component is often able to deal 
with single items (spot tasks), therefore increasing the efficiency of operations 
by negating the need for any other future LR process. This refers to IMAS 08.20 
(Technical Survey) and 09.30 (Explosive Ordnance Disposal – EOD), respectively, 
and are outside the scope of this guide. NTS teams may be tasked with delivering 
Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE) collecting data on victims and similar 
tasks, where appropriate.
Once an area has undergone any form of intrusive intervention, the results of that 
intervention should be compared to the evidence collected during NTS. This will 
indicate the reliability (or otherwise) of NTS and allow for any revisions to the NTS 
process as a whole to be undertaken, including NTS staff training. The results 
of any subsequent technical intervention can be seen as validation of the NTS 
process, creating a feedback loop and leading to continual improvement of the 
NTS process.
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NON-TECHNICAL SURVEY PROCESS
As seen in the diagram above, the NTS process consists of eight steps:
• Desk assessment
• Pre-deployment planning
• Village/stakeholder meeting
• Field visit
• Assessment of findings
• Reporting and debrief
• Internal quality management (QM) of reporting
• Compiling and submitting reports
1
Desk
assessment
5
Assessment
of findings
7
Internal QM
of reporting
8
Compiling
and submitting
reports
4
Field visit
3
Village/
stakeholder
meeting
 
 
 
   
  
 
6
Reporting
and debrief
2
Pre-deployment
planning
Non-Technical
Survey
FIGURE 2 NON-TECHNICAL SURVEY PROCESS
© GICHD 2019
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Desk assessment
Desk assessment is the collection of all possible, relevant data that are available. 
It can be considered to be a broader analysis of the NTS context, including the type 
and likely usage of Explosive Ordnance (EO) hazards likely to be encountered, but 
also historical and socio-economic data. It is carried out in advance of the field visit 
and is part of the planning process for the field visit. Typically, desk assessments 
involve a review of any previous mine action reports from in and around the area to 
be visited. This includes previously recorded Suspected Hazardous Areas (SHAs)/
Confirmed Hazardous Areas (CHAs), clearance or suspension reports and accident 
reports. Clearly, there will be a requirement to access any existing information that 
is available in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), or 
its local equivalent.
Desk assessments should also gather topographical information from any available 
maps and satellite imagery. This information is to be used, not only to get an idea 
of the area to be visited, but also to plan routes in and out. If the past conflict 
involved the creation of defensive works, satellite or unmanned aerial vehicle 
(UAV) imagery can indicate the position of these, which can greatly assist an NTS 
team to narrow down the likely locations of minefields. Large defensive positions 
are also more likely to have been the target of air-delivered weapons and/or land 
service ammunition (LSA), so there is the possibility that these locations may have 
both mine and other EO contamination.
There are sometimes country-specific sources of information that may be 
available during the desk assessment phase. For example, in some countries, 
local newspapers often have stories of mine accidents that have not been reported 
elsewhere. Some countries may also have access to minefield records or bombing 
data which, if reliable, can provide a very effective starting point for a desk study.
An organisational or programme-wide gender and diversity analysis should also 
be included as input to the desk assessment stage. This helps to ensure that the 
team composition reflects the gender and diversity balance in the community and, 
therefore, results in the team accessing the most complete information possible.
It is entirely possible, especially when dealing with previously identified hazardous 
areas based on outdated survey data, that the desk assessment may determine 
that there is no need for a field visit to take place, and the SHA may then be 
cancelled. Reasons for this may be as simple as duplicate entries entered into the 
Information Management (IM) system, or incorrect coordinates for the previously 
identified erroneous SHA, placing it in an unlikely area, such as out to sea.
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Pre-deployment planning
If the desk assessment establishes that there is enough information to justify a field 
visit, pre-deployment planning needs to be carried out, in coordination with or at 
the request of the national mine action authority. This involves planning routes in 
and out and trying to establish, wherever possible, advance communication with 
the location to be visited. If this communication can be established, the team 
can request suitable dates and times to visit to ensure that there is the maximum 
possible community involvement.
The team’s equipment needs to be checked to ensure that it is all in working order 
and that the team is in possession of spare batteries, etc. There are countries 
where it would also be appropriate to ensure that the security situation allows 
NTS teams to operate.
Village/stakeholder meeting
On arriving in a new community, a meeting should be organised to try to involve 
as many community members as possible, including the head of the community 
and representatives from different social and gender/age groups and ethnicities, 
where relevant. Cultural sensitivity also plays an important role in ensuring the 
success, or failure, of the field visit. An effective gender and diversity analysis 
Community meeting with NPA, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2014
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helps to build trust between the NTS team and the local community, by ensuring 
that the survey team adequately responds to the requirements presented by the 
cultural context. In many cultures it is vital that the NTS team visits the head of the 
community and other prominent community members to explain the purpose of 
NTS and to ask for permission. If the leader is supportive of the goal of the NTS 
team, the NTS process can be expected to go much more smoothly than would 
otherwise be the case. Several visits may be required to build up confidence with 
the informants and further individual meetings may take place.
The community meeting seeks to identify those community members that have 
information about any local EO hazards and the approximate location(s) of such 
hazards. If the community agrees that there is no local EO hazard, this information 
should be recorded, and community representatives asked to confirm that they 
agree with this assessment with their signatures. Finding no evidence of EO 
contamination is as important as finding evidence of contamination and should 
be recorded in accordance with national mine action standards (NMAS) minimum 
data requirements.
The NTS team should be trained to recognise that many types of EO are not 
typically found individually, these include cluster sub-munitions and mines. In 
instances where the NTS team finds evidence of an individual cluster sub-munition 
or a mine, this would strongly imply that more are present. However, when 
individual items of EO are found, they are not to be recorded as Confirmed 
Hazardous Areas. Instead, they should be recorded and reported as Explosive 
Ordnance Disposal (EOD) spot tasks.
Field visits
Typically, when the community meeting has concluded and informants have been 
identified, the field visits begin. In the absence of informants but with a positive 
desk assessment, rigorous safety and security conditions should apply and ground 
processing assets should be available. It is likely that each possible SHA will involve 
a separate field visit but this depends on the size of the SHAs and how close they 
are to each other. The field visits seek to confirm the accuracy, or otherwise, of all 
the information collected during the desk assessment and to gather new evidence 
from informants with which to determinate whether an area is contaminated 
with EO, or not. If previous mine action reports of SHAs/CHAs exist, the field 
visit will compare the situation on the ground to that previously reported and 
note any changes that may have occurred since the reports were made. It is 
during this process that land would typically be cancelled, if appropriate. The 
cancellation criteria should be established in national standards and Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOPs).
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Assessment of findings
Once the field visit is completed the team is to cross-check all collected informa-
tion, assess and critically analyse all findings, including information gathered 
during the desk assessment, discussions with the local authority, military, police, 
village meeting/community discussions, key informant interviews and field visits.
If there are no previous reports of evidence of EO contamination then it is not 
possible to cancel any land. Land can only be cancelled if it was previously reported 
as being contaminated with EO. Land can also be cancelled when information 
gathered during the survey indicates that there is in fact no evidence of EO 
contamination in previously suspected areas, and if the process is prescribed 
in national standards, regulations or law. For example, some national standards 
stipulate that reclaimed land, which has been ploughed a minimum of three times 
since the last evidence of a mine was recorded, can be cancelled.
If an SHA/CHA has been identified, it should be marked, mapped as a polygon, 
recorded and the local population debriefed before leaving the site. If for whatever 
reason the access to an area is restricted, the use of aerial imagery could be used 
to gather further evidence.
On returning to the office, the initial report and the maps produced should be 
subject to a quality check, prior to being entered into the Information Management 
(IM) system.
Survey team interviewing members of the local community, Cambodia, 2005
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Reporting and debriefing
Detailed documentation of the information and evidence is a crucial element of 
NTS. Without a sufficiently accurate and robust reporting system, the survey itself 
may be good but planning and priority setting will fail.
Internal QM of reporting
The national mine action authority (NMAA) establishes report forms and formats 
that conform to minimum data requirements and are compatible with the national 
mine action Information Management system. Each form, report and map 
must be carefully checked several times to ensure its accuracy and quality. The 
documentation should be reviewed and signed off by senior operational and IM 
staff before being entered into the IM system and before being submitted to the 
NMAA and any relevant administrative levels of authority.
Compiling and submitting reports
Once a larger geographical area has been surveyed and documents completed 
and checked, a relevant summary should ideally be sent to a higher administrative 
level of authority, such as district or provincial authorities. These higher-level 
authorities may be able to identify possible errors and omissions in the reports. 
The involvement of higher-level authorities in the process can help to improve the 
relationship with the operator.
SOURCES OF INFORMATION
NTS is often seen as a simple process that is purely focussed on collecting 
information from the field, prior to any form of technical intervention. In fact, NTS 
is a more complex, dynamic undertaking that involves the eight-step process, 
followed by ongoing communication with the teams undertaking technical 
interventions.
Other mine action activities, such as Risk Education and Community Liaison, can 
also prove to be useful sources of information regarding Explosive Ordnance (EO) 
contamination.
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Data collection and analysis
As previously discussed, data collection begins with the desk assessment. 
Once this has been completed, the field visit should be scheduled. The field 
visit should be structured in such a way that both male and female informants 
with knowledge about potentially EO-contaminated areas are interviewed. As 
determined by an analysis of the context and previous experience, separate 
meetings should be arranged with households, family groups, female informants 
and children respectively, as these groups might be prevented from participating 
fully in mixed group meetings. The NTS team should be made up of diverse 
individuals and of mixed gender, to ensure that information from different gender 
and ethnic groups in the community can be gathered and cross referenced. 
Part of the pre-deployment planning will be to ensure that the NTS team knows 
the safe routes to the location and that it is equipped with a reliable means of 
communication, to ensure that it can contact the organisation’s headquarters 
in case of any problems. Many countries have seasons during which access to 
certain areas is not possible, due to adverse weather conditions. NTS field visits 
should take these times of year into account when scheduling field visits.
The initial stage of the NTS visit should include a meeting with a local administrator 
or community leader/representative, depending on the social and government 
structures in the area of operations. This can facilitate cooperation with the 
affected community when done in a culturally-sensitive manner.
The NTS field visit should gather information from a number of sources, rather 
than just one person. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) will normally 
specify that a certain minimum 
number of sources is required, 
to ensure confidence that the 
community overall supports 
the findings of NTS. The gender 
and age of informants should 
also be recorded, so that quality 
management (QM) can deter-
mine whether or not NTS teams 
are effectively reaching both 
genders and all ages. The names 
and contact details of all sources 
should be recorded in the NTS 
report, so that any future follow-
up can, if required, confirm the 
information.
Data analysis and report checking, NTS training 
in Lebanon, 2018
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Once the field visit has been concluded, it is important that representatives of the 
local community actually sign the NTS forms to indicate that they are in agreement 
with the information provided.
The NTS process does not end with the field visit; it is an ongoing process of 
collecting and confirming evidence to help with the continual improvement of the 
Land Release (LR) process. NTS and any technical intervention team must share 
information, so that the NTS team can find out how reliable the evidence that they 
have collected is and how it can be improved in the future.
It should be stressed that it is just as important for the NTS team to collect and 
record evidence that supports the conclusion that there is no EO contamination 
in a given area, as it is to find evidence of EO contamination. The documentation 
process for determining that there is no Explosive Ordnance should be as 
rigidly adhered to as for those areas where EO contamination is suspected or 
confirmed. The report form will testify to how information was cross-checked, 
and provides evidence of lack of contamination gathered, with the support of the 
local community. If there is any future adverse event in a location where the NTS 
process concluded that there was no evidence of EO contamination, it is important 
to document why that decision was made, so that lessons may be learned.
Data collection in urban areas
Conflicts in urban areas present additional challenges for NTS, as collapsed 
buildings and other infrastructure often conceal EO contamination, meaning that 
local people are unaware of its existence. Recent conflicts have seen the extensive 
use of improvised explosive devices in urban areas, which pose a hazard to NTS 
teams as well as to local people.
These conflicts often produce large population movements into urban areas, 
which results in a lack of local knowledge among the newly-arrived residents, 
thereby creating a challenge for NTS teams. Some parts of cities may have been 
subjected to a greater degree of EO contamination than other parts, which leads 
to population displacement within the same urban environment. As a result, 
displaced people may know more about the EO contamination in the immediate 
areas of their former homes than they do about their current surroundings.
In this context, adapted standards and SOPs for NTS operations in urban areas 
are required to ensure that staff involved follow special training and deployment, 
and implement specifically designed operational procedures for which they are 
accredited. NTS specific requirements for operations in urban areas are outside 
the scope of this guide.
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Classification of sources
Not all sources are equally reliable and some may have different motives when 
giving information to the NTS team. For example, some landowners may claim 
that their land is affected by EO contamination because they think that the land is 
worth more money once clearance has been done. In these instances, it is vital 
that information is sought from other sources to confirm that the community in 
general believes that the land is contaminated and not just the landowner. The 
requirement to consult confirmatory sources is often set out in SOPs and national 
mine action standards (NMAS).
When dealing with sources, the NTS team should always verify that the source 
lives in the relevant location and has lived there for long enough to possess useful 
knowledge of the local area.
Survey team conducting operations in West Mossul, Iraq, 2018
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Sources are often classified by the perceived reliability of the evidence that they 
are able to provide. In many cases, SOPs will classify sources and specify that the 
NTS teams should seek out specific types of sources, such as current or former 
combatants with direct knowledge of the nature and location of EO contamination.
Relevant experience in the country/region will help to determine how information 
sources are classified. This relevant experience often comes from comparing the 
information received with the actual results of previous technical interventions, 
which will indicate the previous level of reliability of similar sources elsewhere.
Once a classification system has been established, it should be reviewed at 
suitable intervals to ensure that it reflects current findings from the field.
Confidence in sources and evidence
It is not unusual to find that there is conflicting information about the status of 
a particular area of land, with one person claiming that it is contaminated and 
another claiming that it is not. In these cases, it is important to analyse why these 
people have conflicting views about the same piece of land.
The NTS team needs to be able to critically analyse the information that they 
collect. For instance, if an informant claims that a road is not used, owing to the 
suspicion of mines, but the NTS team member can see multiple tyre tracks or 
footprints on the road, there would be little confidence in the informant, or the 
information provided.
The use of land, roads or other infrastructure by local communities is an important 
factor to be taken into account when assessing the accuracy and reliability of 
new information. If, for example, a landowner claims that his land is mined and 
requires clearance, but the land shows clear signs of being used (e.g. It has been 
planted with crops or grazed by animals) the physical evidence suggests that the 
information provided by the landowner is unreliable and further investigation is 
required.
The use of land, roads or other infrastructure should also be considered when 
cancelling parts of or whole existing hazardous areas. The precise criteria for 
cancellation vary from country to country and should be specified in both national 
standards and operator SOPs.
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LAND USE CATEGORIES/
PRIORITISATION
The NTS team will collect information from the local community about the differ-
ent land use in the area. This is often achieved by the use of a locally produced 
community map that shows the areas that are used for different types of activity, 
such as cultivation, grazing, hunting, water collection, firewood collection, etc.
The different land uses will help to identify those areas to be prioritised for NTS 
and any subsequent technical interventions. For example, Explosive Ordnance (EO) 
contamination around a vital water source would typically be prioritised over EO 
contamination in an area used for hunting, when many other hunting areas exist.
The community map can also indicate areas that were previously reported to 
be contaminated with EO but are now in use. This is very useful evidence that 
constitutes the first step when considering any possible cancellation of the area.
The Bosnia and Herzegovina Civil Protection team analysing completed operations and future 
prioritisation with the national mine action centre, 2014
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When considering the cancellation of areas that are in use, it is important to adopt 
a systematic approach that is clearly documented, so that any decision can be 
shown to be evidence-based and reviewed in the future. A systematic approach 
should consider the following:
a. an understanding of the type, nature and distribution of any EO 
contamination in the region and especially within the immediate vicinity 
of the suspected area;
b. a clear and accurate definition of the precise boundaries of the area being 
used and any area not being used;
c. how the area has been used, including the depth of any intrusive activities, 
and the density and intensity of human and mechanical traffic;
d. how long the area has been used for what, if at all, and which activities 
have been undertaken at different times;
e. the results of the monitoring of other areas that have been similarly 
assessed and previously cancelled.
It may be possible to divide the area into subsidiary zones that have been 
subjected to different usages over different lengths of time, which could result 
in different levels of confidence about whether or not some subsidiary zones can 
be considered eligible for cancellation. Suspected or Confirmed Hazardous Areas 
(SHAs/CHAs) can also be subdivided when different contamination types are 
identified in different subsidiary zones and when different technical methodologies 
Clearance activity in Sri Lanka during the rainy season. Working on previously cultivated 
land will make people wonder about the quality of the initial survey
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may be deployed in different subsidiary zones. For example, metal fragmentation 
mines with tripwires have been seen in one subsidiary zone and large, partially-
buried anti-vehicle mines in another.
The implementation of subsidiary zones during NTS should be further reviewed 
during the conduct of technical interventions, in order to continually improve the 
NTS process.
EVIDENCE
The evidence collected by NTS teams falls into two broad categories: indirect 
evidence and direct evidence.
National standards should define what constitutes indirect and direct evidence and 
these definitions should also be reflected in the relevant organisational Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOPs). Each country should ensure that its definitions of 
indirect and direct evidence are appropriate for its own context and not copied 
verbatim from International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). Generally speaking, 
indirect evidence is second-hand, more informal information about possible 
Explosive Ordnance (EO) contamination. Direct evidence is first-hand evidence 
that strongly indicates the presence of EO contamination.
Survey team collecting information immediately post conflict, Sri Lanka, 2009
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Indirect evidence
Verbal indirect evidence comes from second-hand sources of information. Second-
hand sources are people that did not actually see the Explosive Ordnance being 
placed/used and did not have any role in its placement or use.
Another source of indirect evidence is one more stage removed from the second-
hand source. These are sources that have not actually seen the EO being placed/
used but have been told about the hazard by a third party who may only be 
repeating what they have heard. Indirect evidence may come from informants 
who have, for example, heard that there was once an accident in the area but 
don’t know exactly where it was.
The third source of indirect evidence could also be the information that comes 
from historical sources and records, that have either previously been proven to be 
unreliable or their reliability and accuracy have yet to be assessed.
IMAS 08.10 (Non-Technical Survey) provides some examples of what may consti-
tute indirect evidence:
• Potentially productive land not in use;
• Second or third-hand verbal reports from local population/former combatants;
• EO records, where the reliability of such records remains open to doubt or 
has not been assessed;
• Analysis of other known contamination areas, tactics and historical sources;
Interview with farmers, Colombia, 2012
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• Known former combat zones;
• Existence of trenches and barbed wire;
• Reports from previous surveys, which are not supported by direct evidence 
of the presence of contamination;
• EO accidents or incidents where the location of the event cannot be 
accurately identified;
• The presence of components that could potentially be used in the 
construction of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which is specific to 
the local context.
Direct evidence
The best form of direct evidence is EO that can be observed and recorded by 
the NTS team. A traditional NTS team would have to observe this evidence from 
a safe area, without entering the hazardous area. The team may be equipped 
with an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), which could be flown over any area of 
interest. The UAV would seek visual confirmation of any threat, without requiring 
any NTS team member to physically enter the area. If the NTS team also has a 
Technical Survey (TS) component, the TS component may enter the area and seek 
further confirmation of the EO contamination. The implementation of TS requires 
a significantly greater level of deployment than NTS. It also requires full medical 
and casualty evacuation support to be on hand.
The characteristic signature from the detonation of a BLU-97 in Kosovo. It is likely that 
unexploded submunitions will be found nearby
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Another form of direct evidence would be items that are associated with EO 
contamination. In the case of mines or cluster submunitions, this might be 
packaging materials observed in the vicinity. In certain contexts, where previous 
experience has shown it to be the case, the physical identification of military 
positions could indicate the presence of EO. In these cases, the NTS team should 
try to identify which side of the military position was most likely to have been 
approached by enemy forces, because this side is more likely to have been 
protected with mines.
NTS teams should be trained not only to recognise the most common items of EO 
that they are likely to encounter in the area but also some of the most recognisable 
component parts of the EO. Members of local communities will often pick up parts 
of EO; this practice should, of course, be discouraged and risk education training 
for the communities be provided in these instances. However, if some parts of EO 
have been collected, the NTS team can gain valuable evidence about the nature 
of the threat from these parts.
Some examples of this would be the tell-tale small parachutes and spider-like end 
caps associated with BLU-97 cluster strikes or the very distinctive springs that are 
found at the front of the BL-755 submunition. Likewise, local communities may 
have gathered pieces from locations where mines have previously detonated; 
these pieces can indicate the precise model of mine that was used.
Abandoned bombs in Mozambique, where surrounding undergrowth increases the risk 
from bush fires
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If the threat comes from tripwire-activated mines, those placing the mines may 
have left empty wire spools in the vicinity. The spools would have been used to 
store the tripwires prior to unwinding them and then discarded after use. The 
tripwires associated with mines are often tied to either metal or wooden stakes, 
and if the mines themselves are not visible, it may be possible to make out these 
tether stakes. At certain times of the year, the tripwires themselves are more likely 
to be visible in the early morning, when dew has settled on them during the night, 
thus making them appear as a line of water drops.
NTS teams should not remove any physical evidence from the location it was 
found in, as the evidence may be hazardous. It is not the role of the NTS team to 
make technical judgements about what evidence may or may not pose a hazard. 
Physical evidence should not be handled as this could present a threat to the 
team members and set a bad precedent for local communities. If it is safe to do 
so, physical evidence should be photographed with a scale beside it and then 
included in the NTS report.
In certain cases, direct evidence may also come from historical sources and 
records that have previously been shown to be accurate and reliable. This would 
be the case if any minefield records existed and those minefield records had been 
shown to be accurate in other locations.
The most common form of direct evidence comes from people with first-hand 
knowledge of the location and type of EO. This includes former and serving 
military who may have been involved in the emplacement of the EO or any 
subsequent clearance efforts. Direct evidence can also come from individuals who 
have ventured into areas not normally used by other people, such as woodcutters 
or subsistence farmers, who may have observed items that would otherwise 
have been missed. Likewise, any victims of EO will be able to provide information 
about the location of their accident and perhaps information about what it was 
that injured them.
IMAS 08.10 also highlights some examples of direct evidence:
• EO records, where the reliability of such records has been confirmed 
during previous operations
• Visual observation of EO, EO parts, fragmentation or craters
• Detonations by burning or by animals
• Mine signs, fencing, ancillary equipment (boxes, cannisters), etc. 
associated with contamination
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• EO accidents or incidents where the location of the event can be accurately 
determined
• Information from military or former military who laid mines in the area
• Information from local population who have seen EO contamination
• Bombing data from proven and reliable sources
• Tactical assessment based on previous experience of EO hazards in 
comparable areas
• Wreckage of vehicles that have been damaged/destroyed by anti-vehicle mines
In some contexts, it may also be appropriate to consider any visible evidence of 
IEDs, which could include the following: partially exposed wires, pressure plates, 
locally manufactured main charges, etc. Nationally developed, evidence-based 
guidelines are highly recommended to support the Land Release process.
CRITERIA FOR THE DEFINITION OF 
AN SHA AND CHA
The precise criteria used to define the status of an area as being either free from 
any suspicion of Explosive Ordnance (EO) contamination, suspected of being 
contaminated (SHA) or confirmed as being contaminated (CHA) should be 
defined in national standards and, by extension, in operators’ Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOPs).
Some national standards specify that an area needs to have been ploughed for at 
least three years, with nothing found, before it can be considered for cancellation. 
This is merely an example; different criteria will need to be established for different 
countries and conditions.
National standards, evidence-based guidelines and SOPs should provide a list of 
sources of both indirect and direct evidence that can be used to determine the 
classification of the information and how that then leads to the classification of 
the associated hazardous area.
The criteria to be used for creating, refining, differentiating between, and partially 
or wholly cancelling SHAs and CHAs should be clear, agreed and understood by 
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all involved. The criteria are typically developed through a process of discussion 
and agreement between stakeholders.
The national mine action authority (NMAA) should develop criteria to:
a. promote consistent definitions of what constitutes SHAs and CHAs;
b. promote the recording of spot Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) tasks, 
where appropriate;
b. promote uniform application of land cancellation, reduction and clearance 
processes amongst operators;
c. simplify the management of land cancellation, reduction and clearance 
processes;
d. provide a framework for states that needs to document and demonstrate 
compliance with international conventions; and
e. provide an auditable trail of documented decisions that may assist with 
resolving questions relating to any future liability in the case of EO incidents.
Direct evidence would generally lead to the creation of a CHA in the form of a polygon, the 
starting point for clearance operations. This shows a minefield control point in Angola, 2007
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Indirect evidence would generally lead to the creation of an SHA and direct 
evidence would generally lead to the creation of a CHA. Once a hazardous area 
has been defined as either an SHA or a CHA, the NTS team should carefully and 
accurately delineate the boundaries of the area.
One key condition for the cancellation of any area through Non-Technical Survey 
is that “all reasonable effort” has been applied throughout the process. What 
constitutes “all reasonable effort” should be defined in the appropriate national 
standards but for cancellation to be considered appropriate, the NTS team must 
be able to demonstrate that there is no evidence of EO contamination in the area.
For the absence of evidence to be taken as justification for cancellation it must be 
shown that, had contamination been present, all of the efforts applied could have 
been reasonably expected to have found that contamination.
NTS training course, Lebanon, 2018
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EVIDENCE-BASED, DECISION-MAKING 
PROCESS
Any decisions related to the definition of Explosive Ordnance Disposal spot tasks, 
SHAs, CHAs and areas to be cancelled should be taken on the basis of available 
evidence. The quality and quantity of the available evidence is the foundation upon 
which the quality and reliability of decisions will be made. As these decisions 
could potentially result in death or serious injury if incorrect, it is vital that they 
are not taken lightly and that they are subject to continual review and, wherever 
possible, improvement.
All evidence needs to be continually compared and reviewed, in order to provide 
the mine action community with the best information available.
NTS teams should be aware of the types of Explosive Ordnance (EO) contamination 
they are likely to encounter in their specific areas of operation and how that EO 
contamination is likely to have been used. Any finds of previously unknown EO or 
previously unknown methods of deployment should be fed back into the system, 
in order for NTS teams to continually improve their knowledge base.
If appropriate, NTS teams should be trained to understand the effects of the 
passage of time on the sensitivity of EO, the distribution of EO and its detectability. 
For example, over a period of time springs and safety pins are likely to rust, and 
containers may become deformed after exposure to hot and cold temperatures. 
Likewise, mines planted on a slope could start sliding downhill once subject to 
sufficient environmental exposure.
The evidence collected during NTS should be compared with the evidence, or lack 
thereof, collected during any subsequent technical interventions. This acts as a 
form of quality management for the NTS process and helps to build confidence 
that the process is continually improving. It also helps to establish evidence about 
the respective reliability of different information sources.
Should there be any adverse events involving EO in land that was previously 
cancelled, reduced or cleared, it is vital to review the evidence-based decision-
making process to look for means of improvement and to minimise the possibility 
of any more adverse events.
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It is vital that the use of all appropriate evidence in support of decision-making 
is documented, in order to establish and maintain confidence in Non-Technical 
Survey and in the overall land release process. Such evidence should also be 
transparent and made available to support any investigations into matters relating 
to liability.
BASIC IDENTIFICATION OF EXPLOSIVE 
ORDNANCE
Non-Technical Survey (NTS) teams should always be trained to recognise the 
most common types of Explosive Ordnance (EO) that they are likely to encounter 
during operations. At the very minimum, NTS teams should be able to identify the 
different classifications of EO. For example, every member of an NTS team should 
be able to distinguish between a mine, a hand grenade, an artillery projectile and 
a missile. Whilst ideal, it is not always a requirement that an NTS team member 
should know the precise model of the EO that has been found but the team 
member should be able to make a generic identification.
Bounding fragmentation mine
A Guide to Non-Technical Survey | 41
NTS team members should never handle EO and should instruct informants never 
to handle or disturb EO. Even if the NTS team member knows that the EO is safe to 
move, doing so sets a precedent in affected communities that may lead members 
of those communities to handle EO in the future.
Photos of EO or suspicious objects
NTS team members should be trained to take clear photographs of Explosive 
Ordnance items and suspicious objects. These photographs should always be 
taken from safe ground and it should be remembered that, although having 
photographs of an item is ideal, safety should not be compromised in order to 
take those photographs.
It is often difficult to tell the size of items on digital images without using some sort 
of scale. However, for NTS teams it is not always possible to place a ruler or other 
object beside the item, without compromising their safety. On those occasions 
where it is safe to do so, the NTS team may place a ruler beside the item to provide 
approximate dimensions for those interpreting the images.
Should the NTS team be equipped with an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) this 
would generally be the preferred method of recording images of the item.
Identification of EO items, NTS training course, Lebanon, 2018
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GPS coordinates of EO or suspicious objects
The location of the EO item or the suspicious object should be accurately recorded 
using a global positioning system (GPS). National standards and Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOPs) should specify which GPS map datum system 
should be used and all GPS units should be configured to operate on the same 
system. Generally speaking, the map datum used on the GPS should be the same 
as the map datum used on any physical or digital maps that exist of the area, 
otherwise significant errors may arise between the position shown on the GPS unit 
and the map. Different areas of the world use different map data, so it is important 
to verify with the national mine action authority (NMAA) which map datum should 
be used in a specific country.
Organisations conducting NTS should implement appropriate quality management 
processes for the collection, recording and reporting of information. Senior 
operational personnel should review NTS reports, prior to those reports being 
submitted for data entry. After that, database managers should provide survey 
team leaders with copies of database entries, including maps, for review before 
they are formally accepted in the database. This helps to prevent erroneous entries 
from being disseminated further.
If a Suspected Hazardous Area (SHA)/Confirmed Hazardous Area (CHA) is 
established, its perimeter should be recorded using GPS. In order to assist other 
teams to locate the area in the future, a benchmark and/or a reference point will 
need to be identified and these locations recorded using GPS.
NTS field accreditation, Colombia, 2013
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Marking of SHA/CHA/EO
The temporary marking of any identified SHA/CHA/EO is normally the role of the 
NTS team that has identified it. Marking is carried out in accordance with the 
organisation’s SOPs and national standards. If there are no national standards in 
use, the organisation shall ensure that its SOPs conform to IMAS 08.40 (Marking 
Mine and UXO Hazards).
The perimeter of the SHA/CHA is normally marked with warning tape and/
or hazard signs that clearly warn people not to enter the area. If the follow-up 
technical intervention is likely to occur after a considerable delay, it may be 
necessary to visit the marked location periodically to maintain the marking. Local 
populations should be briefed about the meaning of the marking system that has 
been used.
Individual items of EO should be marked in accordance with SOPs. These will 
specify the distance around the item that should be maintained during the marking 
process. Items of EO should never be moved or otherwise disturbed during the 
marking process.
It will be necessary for the NTS team to mark the location of the benchmark and 
any reference points, so that the location can be easily identified in the future. 
Global Non-Technical Survey course, Germany, 2016
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This is generally achieved using spray paint on identifiable points. Buildings are 
often used as both benchmarks and reference points, in which case permission 
from the building’s owner should be sought prior to spray painting.
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
The information that is collected, recorded and reported by NTS teams is the foun-
dation upon which the Land Release (LR) process rests. Therefore, it is imperative 
that the information is of the highest quality possible and that it is recorded and 
reported as accurately as possible.
All stakeholders should ensure that the NTS documentation satisfies quality 
requirements and reflects the needs of all information users. The information 
should be collected in a systematic manner and should conform to a common 
Example of a hazard sign
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reporting standard, which should be established in the national mine action 
standards. Should any shortcomings or nonconformities be found in the quality 
of the information collected during NTS, appropriate corrective and preventive 
action should be taken. The constant re-evaluation of evidence should be part of 
the LR process.
Whatever the reporting standard that is established, all of the raw evidence that 
has been collected during NTS should be retained by a competent authority. In 
the case of any future problem regarding the decisions made as a result of NTS, 
the raw evidence may help to establish if there was any discrepancy between the 
raw evidence and the NTS reporting system.
The information collected during NTS will form a key part of the documentation 
that is to be handed over to those teams that will carry out future technical 
interventions and it will be included in the documentation required for the 
subsequent handover of the land.
Location maps should be used when reporting the boundaries of Suspected 
Hazardous Areas (SHAs) or Confirmed Hazardous Areas (CHAs). These maps may 
be physical or digital maps and should include all turning points of the polygon, 
in addition to the location of the benchmark and any reference points. The maps 
should be produced to scale and include a north marker and a unique identifier. 
Wherever possible, the maps should be detailed enough to show the location of 
any direct evidence of Explosive Ordnance contamination.
Turning points are normally recorded by global positioning systems (GPS) and 
when overlaid on a map, care should be taken to ensure that the precise location 
of the polygon is accurately represented on the map. Some older maps lack the 
accuracy commonly associated with GPS, so although the GPS coordinates may 
be correct, once overlaid on an inaccurate map, the SHA/CHA may be shown to 
be in the “wrong” location. If this is the case, it should be brought to the attention 
of the Information Management department.
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NTS TEAM REQUIREMENTS
The composition, equipment and training of NTS teams varies from country to 
country and also from organisation to organisation. NTS teams are rarely formed 
to only conduct NTS and will usually be expected to fulfil other functions, such as 
Mine Risk Education, marking, Community Liaison and, in some cases, Technical 
Survey (TS). Therefore, there is a considerable variation in the composition, 
equipment and training required for each team.
NTS teams need to possess a combination of both interpersonal and technical 
skills. The interpersonal skills assist with gaining the confidence of the local 
population, in order to gather the relevant information. The technical skills required 
fall into three different skill sets:
• the requisite knowledge about the Explosive Ordnance (EO) found in the 
region and how it was used;
• the ability to critically analyse the information collected to make informed 
decisions about the location of EO contamination and;
• the ability to accurately record and map the information.
NPA NTS team, Zimbabwe, 2013
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Team composition and training
The precise composition of any NTS team will vary in accordance with the 
additional roles that the team may also be tasked with. Most organisations 
establish NTS teams composed of 4-6 members, which includes a team leader, 
driver and surveyors.
Wherever possible, the NTS team leader should be an experienced deminer, with 
a good background in the nature and methods of use of EO in the region. The 
team leader should also have good interpersonal and technical skills. In mature 
programmes, where appropriate individuals are available, someone such as a 
former demining team leader with the requisite skills should be considered for 
the role of NTS team leader.
If NTS teams are also tasked to implement some form of limited TS, as some 
organisations do, a dedicated medic and a casualty evacuation vehicle will also 
be required. If the NTS team is not undertaking any form of intrusive intervention, 
there may be no requirement for a dedicated medic but it is good practice to 
ensure that the team members have received first-aid training. Of course, those 
NTS teams implementing limited TS will need to include trained deminers.
The NTS team should, whenever possible, incorporate members of both genders, 
which allows for a more culturally-sensitive approach and should enable a better 
quality of information to be collected, once the different gender perspectives have 
been taken into account. Having a team with both genders is especially important 
when the cultural context makes it inappropriate for different genders to interact 
with one another. The different genders may have different and complementary/
contradictory information about EO contamination, so it is important that they are 
both consulted. In addition to gender, there may be other diversity considerations 
to bear in mind; this is especially the case when dealing with distinct ethnic 
minorities, who may feel more comfortable talking to members of their own 
ethnicity, rather than to members of the main ethnic group.
Team members should be culturally sensitive and able to fluently communicate 
with the population that they are working with. When populations are ethnically or 
linguistically diverse, care should be taken to ensure that this diversity is reflected 
within the NTS team.
NTS team members will need to be able to critically analyse the information they 
are given and then accurately record it, both on the ground and in the required 
reporting format.
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Team equipment
As with the team composition, the team equipment will vary from organisation 
to organisation and from country to country, as it is dependent upon whatever 
additional roles the NTS team may be asked to fulfil.
The basic level of equipment that any NTS team should carry will be specified in 
the appropriate Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), however, a suggested list 
is as follows:
a. Minimum of 2 GPS units with spare batteries
b. Laser rangefinder
c. Appropriate equipment for environmental conditions (rain gear, warm 
clothes, sun hat etc.)
d. Handheld VHF radios (for communication between team members)
e. Reliable means of communication with HQ (mobile/satellite phone, etc.)
f. Camera
g. First aid kit
h. Mine marking signs, hammer and nails
i. Compass (preferably prismatic)
j. Ruler
k. Measuring tape
m. Paint for benchmark
n. Mine marking tape
o. A4 millimetre paper for sketch map
p. A0 paper for community map
q. Required paperwork (task folder, travel authorisation, notebook, data entry 
forms/reports etc.)
r. Pens, pencils, markers
s. Emergency food and water (as appropriate)
t. Vehicle(s) appropriate for the terrain and large enough to transport all team 
members and equipment
u. Photographs of the most commonly encountered EO
v. Unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), as deemed necessary
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Many organisations are moving towards equipping NTS teams with electronic 
means of recording and transmitting the information received. However, NTS 
teams should still take paper forms as a backup, in case of any technical problems.
If the team is also trained and tasked to undertake TS, it should also be equipped 
with the appropriate detectors, a dedicated medic, a medical trauma pack and a 
casualty evacuation vehicle.
NTS team equipment
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TRAINING REQUIREMENTS 
FOR NTS TEAMS
Good quality training and recruitment of NTS teams is vital to ensure high quality 
NTS. Wherever possible, some NTS team members should be experienced 
deminers with good knowledge of the nature of local Explosive Ordnance (EO) 
contamination.
NTS teams should be trained in both soft (interpersonal) and hard (technical) skills 
required to carry out their role.
Some suggested topics for an NTS training syllabus are as follows:
1.  Five pillars of mine action
2.   Introduction to mine action in the relevant country (current situation, 
coordination, other actors)
3.  Land Release concept and processes
4.  NTS standards, from IMAS to NMAS to SOPs
5.  Basic identification of EO
6.  History of the conflict
7.  Mine laying and military tactics in the country
8.  Identifying/managing sources of information
9.  Critical thinking – managing, classifying and recognising evidence
10.  Datum and coordinates system (i.e. latitude/longitude and Universal 
Transverse Mercator – UTM)
11. Map scales
12. Map reading (topographical, satellite, aerial photo, Google Earth)
13. Use of GPS (set up and logging and retrieving waypoints)
14. Use of compass (normal and prismatic)
15. Bearings and distance (tape measure, rangefinder, distance estimations)
16. Mapping (hand-drawn sketch map and ArcGIS)
17. Delivery of basic risk education
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18.  Interview techniques and communication skills (avoidance prepping, 
closed or leading questions, interviews during community meetings and 
individual interviews)
19. Cultural and customary understanding, and behaviour and gender roles
20. First aid and MEDEVAC
21. Communications
22. Reporting
23.  Vehicle driving and maintenance (daily checks, tyre changes, use of fire 
extinguisher, etc.)
24. Information Management systems
NTS training course, Lebanon, 2018
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 
PRINCIPLES FOR NTS
Information Management (IM) involves the collection, storage, analysis of data 
and use of information. Non-Technical Survey (NTS) is a key component in the 
collection of information. All IM processes and procedures should be implemented 
in accordance with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 05.10 (Information 
Management for Mine Action), national mine action standards (NMAS) and 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).
The IM system should have the capability to analyse the information provided by 
NTS teams and look for both commonalities and outliers in the data provided.
The responsibility for good IM is the responsibility of the whole organisation, 
rather than just the IM department itself. Organisations should try to ensure that 
IM is embedded in the awareness and training of operational staff and is seen as 
an integral part of the overall mine action team, rather than being a stand-alone 
entity. Both operational staff and IM staff should have a good understanding of the 
roles and requirements of both sides, to allow them to work together to establish 
optimal solutions.
The national mine action authority (NMAA) shall establish a national standard for 
the format of NTS reporting, which is to be used by all organisations accredited to 
undertake NTS. Wherever possible, this national standard should be in compliance 
with IMAS minimum data requirements. Individual organisations may have to 
collect additional information as part of their requirements for donors, but the 
additional information should not be interspersed with the information required 
by the NMAA.
The information gathered by NTS should be subject to quality management 
prior to being entered into the organisation’s IM system. Once entered into the 
Information Management system, the NTS team leader should verify that the entry 
corresponds to the base documentation. The information will be further checked 
by the IM manager and the operations officer prior to being sent to the NMAA for 
entry into the national database.
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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NTS AND TS
The Land Release (LR) process generally starts with NTS and then leads on 
to TS and clearance, if warranted by the evidence found at each stage. All of 
these elements involve the collection, analysis and verification of evidence. NTS 
is normally the default first element in the LR process because it is more cost 
efficient and gives a logical evidence-based approach upon which to decide if any 
technical intervention is needed.
NTS and TS complement each other in the LR process and some organisations 
embed a TS capability within NTS teams. The aim of using TS elements in support 
of NTS is to immediately verify or disprove the evidence produced by NTS. 
This either leads to a more accurate definition of the perimeters of Confirmed 
Hazardous Areas (CHAs) or more areas being cancelled, or if they are new areas, 
not being recorded in the first place.
If an organisation embeds a TS component within an NTS team, this component 
generally consists of trained and experienced manual deminers equipped with 
detectors. Owing to the small size of the TS component, the TS carried out will 
be limited and targeted at specific areas. The aim of the TS is to either confirm 
NTS training course, Thailand, 2016
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that evidence of Explosive Ordnance contamination exists or to build confidence 
that areas are safe to be used.
In addition to the TS component, NTS teams may also have an Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal (EOD) component, which is able to deal with spot Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal tasks. When there is a Multi-Tasking Team, it is crucial that the reporting 
is clear, and no double entries or incorrect attributions of LR methodologies are 
linked with certain activities (e.g. cancellation of area should always be through 
NTS and not TS, etc).
COMMUNICATION IN NTS
The skills required for effective NTS can be divided into hard and soft skills. Hard 
skills are those associated with the technical aspects of NTS, such as identifying 
Explosive Ordnance (EO) contamination and recording hazardous areas. Soft 
skills for NTS are those skills involved in establishing interpersonal and culturally 
appropriate connections that encourage sources to want to provide information 
to the NTS team.
The NTS team should always dress and behave in a culturally appropriate manner.
The NTS team should identify all relevant sources of information in a community 
and ensure that information from these sources is appropriately collected and 
recorded. NTS teams rely on the goodwill of the communities and it is vital to 
maintain that goodwill.
NTS teams should be aware that repeated visits to the same informant may result 
in an increasing level of “survey fatigue”, so this should be avoided whenever 
possible.
Interview techniques
When asking questions, always be polite and appreciative of the information that 
is received. The informants are under no obligation to provide any information 
at all, so NTS teams should try to create an atmosphere of mutual assistance; 
the community is helping the NTS team to do its job and the NTS is helping the 
community to deal with whatever EO contamination problem may exist.
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Prior to beginning the interview, the interviewee should be made aware of the 
purpose of the NTS and asked if s/he is willing to cooperate. The interview should 
be carried out in a friendly, informal manner that encourages the interviewee to 
offer relevant information. Care should be taken to avoid making the interviewee 
feel uncomfortable and also to avoid the interview resembling any kind of 
interrogation.
Effective interviewing requires a structured approach that is both professional and 
efficient. The PRICE model of interviewing is recommended as being an approach 
that is ethical, fair and achieves consistent results.
PRICE is a mnemonic standing for:
• Planning and preparation
• Rapport
• Information
• Clarifying and confirming
• Evaluation
Interview technique learning, global Non-Technical Survey course, Germany, 2016
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Planning and preparation
Effective interviewing is based on good preparation and planning. A list of 
questions should be prepared that can be used to gather information from all 
prospective informants. These questions establish the criteria required for a 
successful interview. There will also be a requirement to assess the reliability of 
each prospective informant and not only the information that they provide.
Rapport
At the start of the interview the aim should be to establish the right level of rapport 
with informants. The aim of the interview is to obtain good quality information. 
Putting informants at ease means that they are much more likely to talk freely. 
In some cases, several meetings might be required to ensure a good level of 
confidence is established with the informants.
Information
Think of the interview as a structured conversation. The role of the interviewer is to 
give direction to that conversation by asking appropriate questions and steering it 
in the right direction. The aim should be for the informant to do most of the talking 
and the interviewer to do most of the listening.
Clarifying and confirming
Encourage a free flow of information from the interviewee, let them tell their story. 
Try not to interrupt, take note of questions you want to ask after the interviewee 
has finished. Informants must be given the opportunity to ask any questions of 
their own. At the end of the interview the interviewer should explain the next steps 
in the mine action process.
Evaluation
After the interview the interviewer needs to evaluate the information collected 
against the criteria established during the preparation phase. For example, whether 
the interviewer feels that s/he has all of the information required to establish the 
perimeter of any hazardous area and the contact details of the informant in case 
any follow-up information is required.
Patience is a worthy attribute and it may be necessary to politely listen to other 
concerns voiced by the community, while gently trying to steer the interview 
back on topic.
Although the actual questions themselves may be presented in list form, the way 
they are asked should be as neutral and open as possible, without trying to lead 
the interviewee into making certain statements. The NTS team should avoid the 
possibility of implying that some answers would be preferred over others.
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Whenever possible, questions should be open rather than closed. This means that 
questions with either a yes or a no answer should be discouraged. People should 
be encouraged to discuss their knowledge of EO contamination in the local area 
in a general way to begin with before asking them for any specific locations.
The NTS team will require the ability to think critically about the information they 
are receiving, in order to evaluate the reliability of both the information and the 
informant. For example, if an informant tells the team that a certain path has not 
been used for years, yet there is no vegetation on it and footsteps are clearly 
visible, it is clear that this information is incorrect. However, it is important to verify 
as the informant may actually be discussing a different path, so the error may be 
with the NTS team rather than the informant.
Cross-cultural communication
In post-conflict situations involving different ethnicities speaking different 
languages, it is often helpful to have an NTS team made up of the different 
ethnicities. This would also be the case in areas where ethnic minorities are 
present.
In addition to always dressing and behaving in a culturally appropriate manner, 
NTS teams should research, if required, the appropriate cultural behaviour in the 
different contexts they are likely to be working in.
Interviewing a member of the local community, Colombia, 2013
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GENDER AND DIVERSITY
Mainstreaming gender in NTS ensures that the contributions, concerns and needs 
of all members of affected communities are acknowledged and addressed without 
bias. This also benefits the whole community by ensuring a more coherent, 
holistic, multidimensional response to the different needs of mine-affected 
women, girls, boys and men. Gender mainstreaming in NTS is not only about 
equality, it is also about quality.
In addition to gender and age, there are other criteria that characterise different 
groups of people. These need to be taken into account to ensure that mine action 
benefits everyone equally. Roles, mobility patterns and knowledge of contamina-
tion differ due to gender and age, but are also influenced by other aspects, such as 
class, job, language, race, ethnicity, political affiliation, religion, education, sexual 
orientation, literacy, disability, residency status/migration history, etc. These and 
other aspects are referred to as “diversity”.
The NTS team should be made up of both male and female members, so that, 
if cultural norms require, male and female participants may be interviewed 
separately by members of their own gender.
The survey should be structured in such a way that both male and female 
informants with specific knowledge about potentially EO-contaminated areas are 
interviewed as part of the process.
Equality and inclusion considerations for NTS
It should always be borne in mind that once those in leadership positions have 
spoken, those in less fortunate positions are often unwilling to say anything that 
could be considered to be against the “party line”.
Where appropriate, separate meetings should be arranged with households, family 
groups, female informants and children respectively, as these groups might be 
prevented from participating fully in mixed group meetings.
Additionally, the times and venues of meetings should take into account the roles 
and responsibilities of each group, to avoid inadvertently excluding one group 
because of their occupation or because of their different level of mobility.
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QUALITY MANAGEMENT
Like any mine action activity, Non-Technical Survey (NTS) should be subject to 
quality management (QM), with the goal of continual improvement. QM will occur 
both internally (within the organisation) and externally (by the national mine action 
authority or a suitably qualified and accredited proxy).
NTS should be seen as part of the Land Release process, rather than as a stand-
alone activity, and therefore subject to the same demanding quality management 
process applying to all operations. This is important because the best quality 
management of NTS is to compare the evidence it has gathered to the evidence 
collected during any subsequent technical intervention or to any adverse event 
post-cancellation.
Internal process
QM of NTS, as in other mine action activities, can be dividing into quality assurance 
(QA) of the processes of NTS and quality control (QC) of the product of NTS.
The internal QA process will focus on ensuring that:
a. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) have been followed;
b. relevant, logical and clear decisions have been made;
c. necessary evidence has been collected and correctly documented in 
report forms designed with an agreed level of detail and;
d. the most relevant and reliable information sources have been found 
and used.
The internal QC process is focussed on the quality of the product of NTS, which is 
the information (evidence) and the decisions made on the basis of that evidence. 
As such, the QC process should ensure that the information produced by NTS is:
a. Relevant;
b. Complete and;
c. Accurate.
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The above points should include such questions as:
a. Were the correct GPS coordinates given for the location in question?
b. Does the sketch map correspond to the electronic map?
c. Does the sketch map contain all relevant information?
d. Was the type of Explosive Ordnance (EO) contamination correctly 
recorded?
e. Was the perimeter of the hazardous area correctly identified and marked?
f. Were the names and contact details of sources correctly recorded?
g. If land has been cancelled, has the local community indicated their 
confidence that the cancelled land may be used?
In addition to the information produced by NTS, the internal QC process should 
verify the quality of the decisions made on the basis of that evidence:
a. Were the decisions made in accordance with the criteria laid down in 
SOPs and national mine action standards (NMAS)?
b. Are the decisions that have been made logical in this particular context?
c. Is there consistency between the decisions made by different teams or 
by the same team in different areas?
Although there is generally no technical sampling conducted of land cancelled by 
NTS, the subsequent use of that land will indicate the quality of the decisions made 
during NTS. Any adverse event could indicate that the decision made to cancel the 
land needs to be reviewed. This is not always the case, as findings of individual 
items of EO would not generally indicate that a review is required. Individual items 
of EO would generally be determined to constitute residual risk.
If the NTS team has recommended the cancellation of an area, it is vital that the 
recommendation is endorsed by a series of senior actors within the organisation 
before the recommendation is acted upon. The QC system should ensure that this 
process has been rigorously followed and documented.
The most informative method of internal QC occurs when the polygon defined by 
NTS is then subject to technical interventions. The locations and characteristics 
of any actual contamination discovered during technical interventions will be 
compared with the expected results of NTS. This will provide a clear relationship 
between the actual situation and the accuracy and completeness of the evidence 
that was described in the survey.
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Any subsequent technical intervention will demonstrate if NTS was correct about 
the type of EO contamination and how closely the boundaries of the polygon were 
drawn in relation to the boundaries of the actual hazardous area.
External process
External quality management of the NTS teams should be undertaken by the 
national mine action authority (NMAA) or a suitably qualified and accredited 
organisation on behalf of the NMAA.
Just like the internal QM processes described in the previous section, external 
QM will involve both quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC). QA will 
examine the quality of the processes, which examines whether or not NTS was 
implemented in accordance with the relevant SOPs. This involves ensuring that 
the team is carrying all of the correct team equipment and that the equipment is 
functioning correctly, in addition to ensuring that the team is implementing the 
NTS process in accordance with SOPs.
With the field report forms, the QC process will examine the quality of the outputs 
from the NTS teams, which are the evidence gathered and the decisions made, 
based on that evidence. External QM will compare the evidence produced by the 
NTS teams to the evidence produced by any future technical interventions, or 
future adverse event, for indications of accuracy or inaccuracy.
It is possible that the organisation conducting a technical intervention after NTS 
is not the same organisation that conducted the survey. In these instances, the 
NMAA should ensure that the results of the technical interventions are shared 
with the organisation conducting the NTS, so that the process may benefit from 
the feedback.
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SAFETY AND SECURITY IN THE FIELD
As in all mine action activities, safety and security are paramount in the conduct 
of NTS. The NTS team leader should detail a brief CASEVAC plan on arrival at 
every new site.
The risks to NTS teams are not limited to the risks associated with Explosive 
Ordnance (EO) but also include such aspects as driving in developing countries 
and the prevailing security situation in the areas of operation.
NTS is typically an activity that does not require any team members to enter 
hazardous areas. As such, there should not be a requirement for a dedicated medic 
in an NTS team. However, NTS team members should be trained in basic first aid 
and the team should be equipped with a basic first aid kit. This is not intended for 
the treatment of casualties caused by EO but rather for the treatment of everyday 
injuries that may occur.
The NTS team should always inform headquarters (HQ) of the location to be visited 
and the route to be taken. It may also be appropriate that the NTS team checks in 
with HQ at regular intervals throughout the day. This will require a reliable means 
of communication with HQ; this should be a mobile phone, satellite phone or HF 
radio, depending upon the local circumstances.
The NTS team should be aware of any movement restrictions that may be in place 
in the area of operations and coordinate with the relevant authorities to ensure 
compliance with these restrictions.
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The NTS team should be aware of the location of the nearest medical facility and 
the route to it. In more remote locations, there may be a requirement to research 
the location of nearby airstrips or possible helicopter landing sites, if applicable.
NTS team members should only walk or drive in areas where there is no evidence 
of EO contamination and significant evidence of previous use of such areas.
If following an informant towards a potentially hazardous area, team members 
should only travel on well-used paths or areas that have been cultivated. When 
following an informant, it is important to ask that informant to stop some distance 
from the potentially hazardous area and to indicate the area from afar.
Informants should be dissuaded from walking into or throwing any objects into 
potentially hazardous areas.
If the NTS team contains an embedded TS component, all of the relevant Standard 
Operating Procedures specifying the safety precautions to be taken, should be 
followed.
RISK EDUCATION AFTER NTS
Non-Technical Survey (NTS) teams may have to be double-hatted and required to 
perform risk education, in addition to the NTS role. In this instance the NTS team 
will perform both NTS and risk education.
Risk education in Laos, 2008
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For NTS teams that are not formally tasked with implementing the risk education 
role, there could still be a requirement to provide a basic level of risk education to 
affected communities, this includes a clear explanation of which areas have been 
marked as hazardous.
• Affected communities need to understand the requirement to stay out of 
those areas that have been temporarily marked as hazardous.
• Adult members of the community should ensure that children are made 
aware of the meaning of the marking and of the requirement to respect it.
• Affected communities should be made aware of the requirement to leave 
the marking in place and not to remove it.
Affected communities should be told that if any future suspected items of 
Explosive Ordnance (EO) are found they are not to be moved or otherwise 
disturbed. A reporting mechanism for any suspected items of EO should be 
established, to allow the affected community to report any future finds.
Risk education in Iraq, 2018
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TECHNOLOGY IN NTS
As in other areas of mine action, technology is playing a valuable role in the 
modernisation and increased effectiveness and efficiency of NTS. The two most 
meaningful contributions that technology has made to NTS are in the use of mobile 
applications and unmanned aerial systems (UAS). UAS are often referred to as drones.
Mobile applications
Mobile applications allow the NTS teams to digitally collect data during field visits. 
The mobile application will be in the same format as the paper NTS forms but the 
data fields can be completed using a 
tablet or similar device. The advan-
tage of using mobile applications is 
that the data can be remotely trans-
mitted to the Information Manage-
ment section whenever a mobile 
phone data connection is available. 
This saves a great deal of time and 
eliminates the possibility of data-
inputting errors that are associated 
with manually entering paper forms 
into databases.
However, mobile applications do not 
eliminate the data inputting errors 
that may be made by the original NTS 
team. As such, it is vital that strong 
internal quality management (QM) 
controls are put in place to ensure 
that the data collected by the NTS 
team are accurate before they are 
entered into the database.
The use of mobile applications can 
be used as a management/quality 
management tool to verify the activi-
ties of the team at given times and 
locations.
The mine action reporting system (MARS) 
developed by the GICHD bridges the 
information gaps in mine action programmes 
and replaces paper forms with digital data 
collection tools. Above: making polygons and 
adding other sketch features
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Unmanned aerial systems
UAS have proved to be a very valuable tool for NTS teams. The UAS may be fitted 
with high definition cameras or thermal imaging sensors. However, a balance has 
to be found between the cost of high-end technical systems and the number of 
systems that are available to be used by NTS teams.
Cameras can show evidence or the lack of evidence in real-time, although the 
recording may require a more detailed analysis to verify details. Thermal imaging 
systems can show the difference in temperature that exists between the natural 
environment and any metal components. Thermal imaging sensors are more 
effective at the beginning of the day, when any metal components would heat up 
faster than the surrounding environment.
If UAS are to be used by NTS teams, there will be a requirement to train team 
members in their operation and in the maintenance and interpretation of the data 
that are produced.
The HALO Trust had this SHA recorded in the national database. The survey team noticed 
that it is actively used for agriculture (already for several years) so HALO Trust used 
UAS high temporal resolution imagery as proof for cancellation and attached it to the 
cancellation report
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VISITORS TO NTS OPERATIONS
Any visitors to NTS operations must be thoroughly briefed on all safety aspects 
prior to deploying with the team.
• Visitors must agree to stay with the team during operations and not to 
unilaterally wander off.
• Visitors should agree to follow the instructions of NTS team members.
• Visitors from outside the organisation may have to sign a waiver absolving 
the organisation from any legal responsibility for any accident or injury of 
any kind.
• If the NTS team members feel that safety is being compromised in any way, 
the visitor should be escorted back to the vehicle and the visit shall end.
IMSMA Core is based on ESRI leading geographical information system (GIS) technology, 
thus benefiting from the latest developments; this includes 3D mapping, UAV imagery 
integration and data sharing
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RESPONSIBILITIES AND OBLIGATIONS
Any organisation undertaking NTS has a number of responsibilities and obligations 
that it must undertake prior to and during the carrying out of NTS operations. 
These responsibilities and obligations are as follows:
a. The organisation must be accredited by the national mine action authority 
(NMAA or equivalent) to undertake NTS;
b. National standards should be applied. In the absence of national standards, 
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) should be applied;
c. The organisation must develop and apply accredited Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOPs) for NTS;
d. The organisation must collect all necessary information as required by 
the NTS documentation;
e. Where applicable, the organisation shall conduct a formal handover 
of assessed sites to those organisations conducting subsequent technical 
interventions;
f. All required documentation shall be maintained and made available to 
the NMAA on request;
g. The local community, of both genders and all age groups, shall be consulted 
with regards to key decisions made by NTS; and
h. Report recipients should provide feedback about the quality, timeliness 
and content of the NTS reports, to support the continual improvement 
of the process.
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ANNEX A
NTS PROCESS MAP
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NTS PROCESS MAP
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